Continually arriving information is communicated through a network of n agents, with the value of information to the j'th recipient being a decreasing function of j/n, and communication costs paid by recipient. Regardless of details of network and communication costs, the social optimum policy is to communicate arbitrarily slowly. But selfish agent behavior leads to Nash equilibria which (in the n → ∞ limit) may be efficient (Nash payoff = social optimum payoff) or wasteful (0 < Nash payoff < social optimum payoff) or totally wasteful (Nash payoff = 0). We study the cases of the complete network (constant communication costs between all agents), the grid with only nearest-neighbor communication, and the grid with communication cost a function of distance. The main technical tool is analysis of the associated first passage percolation process or SI epidemic (representing spread of one item of information) and in particular its "window width", the time interval during which most agents learn the item.
1 Introduction
The general framework: a rank-based reward game
There are n agents (our results are in the n → ∞ limit). The basic two rules are: Rule 1. New items of information arrive at times of a rate-1 Poisson process; each item comes to one random agent.
Information spreads between agents by virtue of one agent calling another and learning all items that the other knows (details are case-specific, described later), with a (case-specific) communication cost paid by the receiver of information. 
Assuming information eventually reaches each agent, the total reward from each item will be n j=1 R( j n ) ∼ nR. If agents behave in some "exchangeable" way then the average net payoff (per agent per unit time) is payoff =R − (average communication cost per agent per unit time).
(2)
Now the average communication cost per unit time can be made arbitrarily small by simply communicating less often (because an agent learns all items that another agent knows, for the cost of one call. Note the calling agent does not know in advance whether the other agent has any new items of information). Thus the "social optimum" protocol is to communicate arbitrarily slowly, giving payoff arbitrarily close toR. But if agents behave selfishly then one agent may gain an advantage by paying to obtain information more quickly, and so we seek to study Nash equilibria for selfish agents. In particular there are three qualitative different possibilities. In the n → ∞ limit, the Nash equilibrium may be
• efficient (Nash payoff = social optimum payoff)
• or wasteful (0 < Nash payoff < social optimum payoff)
• or totally wasteful (Nash payoff = 0).
Methodology
Allowing agents' behaviors to be completely general makes the problems rather complicated (e.g. a subset of agents could seek to coordinate their actions) so in each specific model we restrict agent behavior to be of a specified form, making calls at random times with a rate parameter θ; the agent's "strategy" is just a choice of θ, and for this discussion we assume θ is a single real number. If all agents use the same parameter value θ then the spread of one item of information through the network is as some model-dependent first passage percolation process (see section 2.2). So there is some function F θ,n (t) giving the proportion of agents who learn the item within time t after the arrival of the information into the network. Now suppose one agent ego uses a different parameter value φ and gets some payoff-per-unit-time, denoted by payoff(φ, θ). The Nash equilibrium value θ Nash is the value of θ for which ego cannot do better by choosing a different value of φ, and hence is the solution of
Obtaining a formula for payoff(φ, θ) requires knowing F θ,n (t) and knowing something about the geometry of the sets of informed agents at time t -see (19,26) for the two basic examples. The important point is that where we know the exact n → ∞ limit behavior of F θ,n (t) we get a formula for the exact limit θ Nash , and where we know order of magnitude behavior of F θ,n (t) we get order of magnitude behavior of θ Nash .
Note that we have assumed that in a Nash equilibrium each agent uses the same strategy. This is only a sensible assumption when the network cost structure has enough symmetry (is transitive -see section 7.1) and the non-transitive case is an interesting topic for future study.
It turns out (section 4) that for determining the qualitative behavior of the Nash equilibria, the important aspect is the size of the window width w θ,n of the associated first passage percolation process, that is the time interval over which the proportion of agents knowing the item of information increases from (say) 10% to 90%. While this is well understood in the simplest examples of first passage percolation on finite sets, it has not been studied for very general models and our game-theoretic questions provide motivation for future such study.
To interpret later formulas it turns out to be convenient to work with the derivative of R. Write R ′ (u) = −r(u), so that R(u) = 1 u r(s)ds and (1) becomes
1.3 Summary of results
The complete graph case
Network communication model: Each agent i may, at any time, call any other agent j (at cost 1), and learn all items that j knows.
Poisson strategy. The allowed strategy for an agent i is to place calls, at the times of a Poisson (rate θ) process, to a random agent.
Result (section 2). In the n → ∞ limit the Nash equilibrium value of θ is
where
Our assumptions (1) on R(u) imply 0 < θ Nash <R. Because an agent's average cost per unit time equals his value of θ, from (2) the Nash equilibrium payoffR − θ Nash is strictly less than the social optimum payoffR but strictly greater than 0. So this is a "wasteful" case.
The nearest neighbor grid
Network communication model: Agents are at the vertices of the N × N torus (i.e. the grid with periodic boundary conditions). Each agent i may, at any time, call any of the 4 neighboring agents j (at cost 1), and learn all items that j knows.
Poisson strategy. The allowed strategy for an agent i is to place calls, at the times of a Poisson (rate θ) process, to a random neighboring agent.
Result (section 3). The Nash equilibrium value of θ is such that as
where g(u) > 0 is a certain complicated function -see (28).
So here the Nash equilibrium payoffR − θ Nash N tends toR; this is an "efficient" case.
Grid with communication costs increasing with distance
Network communication model. The agents are at the vertices of the N × N torus. Each agent i may, at any time, call any other agent j, at cost c(N, d(i, j)), and learn all items that j knows.
Here d(i, j) is the distance between i and j. We treat two cases, with different choices of c(N, d). In section 5 we take cost function c(N, d) = c(d) satisfying
and Poisson strategy. An agent's strategy is described by a sequence (θ(d); d = 1, 2, 3, . . .); where for each d: at rate θ(d) the agent calls a random agent at distance d.
In this case a simple abstract argument (section 5) shows that the Nash equilibrium is efficient (without calculating what the equilibrium strategy or payoff actually is) for any c(d) satisfying (7).
In section 6 we take
and
Poisson strategy. An agent's strategy is described by a pair of numbers (θ near , θ far ) = θ:
at rate θ near the agent calls a random neighbor at rate θ far the agent calls a random non-neighbor.
In this case we show (42) that the Nash equilibrium strategy satisfies , implying that the equilibrium is efficient.
Plan of paper
The two basic cases (complete graph, nearest-neighbor grid) can be analyzed directly using known results for first passage percolation on these structures; we do this analysis in sections 2 and 3. There are of course simple arguments for order-of-magnitude behavior in those cases, which we recall in section 4 (but which the reader may prefer to consult first) as a preliminary to the more complicated model "grid with communication costs increasing with distance", for which one needs to understand orders of magnitude before embarking on calculations.
Variant models and questions
These results suggest many alternate questions and models, a few of which are addressed briefly in the sections indicated, the others providing suggestions for future research.
• Are there cases where the Nash equilibrium is totally wasteful? (section 2.1)
• Wouldn't it be better to place calls at regular time intervals? (section 7.
2)
• Can one analyze more general strategies?
• In the grid context of section 1.3.3 , what is the equilibrium strategy and cost for more general costs c(N, d)?
• What about the symmetric model where, when i calls j, they exchange information? (section 7.1)
• In formulas (5,6) we see decoupling between the reward function r(u) and the function g(u) involving the rest of the model -is this a general phenomenon?
• In the nearest-neighbor grid case, wouldn't it be better to cycle calls through the 4 neighbors?
• What about non-transitive models, e.g. social networks where different agents have different numbers of friends, so that different agents have different strategies in the Nash equilibrium?
• To model gossip, wouldn't it be better to make the reward to agent i depend on the number of other agents who learn the item from agent i? (section 7.3)
• To model insider trading, wouldn't it be better to say that agent j is willing to pay some amount s(t) to agent i for information that i has possessed for time t, the function s(·) not specified in advance but a component of strategy and hence with a Nash equilibrium value?
Conclusions
As the list above suggests, we are only scratching the surface of a potentially large topic. In the usual setting of information communication networks, the goal is to communicate quickly, and our two basic examples (complete graph; nearest-neighbor grid) are the extremes of rapid and slow communication. It is therefore paradoxical that, in our rank-based reward game, the latter is efficient while the former is inefficient. One might jump to the conclusion that in general efficiency in the rank-based reward game was inversely related to network connectivity. But the examples of the grid with long-range interaction show the situation is not so simple, in that agents could choose to make long range calls and emulate a highly-connected network, but in equilibrium they do not do so very often.
The complete graph
The default assumptions in this section are Network communication model: Each agent i may, at any time, call any other agent j (at cost 1), and learn all items that j knows.
Finite number of rewards
Before deriving the result (5) in our general framework, let us step outside that framework to derive a very easy variant result. Suppose that only the first two recipients of an item of information receive a reward, of amount w n say. Agent strategy cannot affect the first recipient, only the second. Suppose ego uses rate φ and other agents use rate θ. Then (by elementary properties of Exponential distributions) P (ego is second to receive item) = φ φ + (n − 2)θ (8) and so
and then the criterion (3) gives
To compare this variant with the general framework, we want the total reward available from an item to equal n, to make the social optimum payoff → 1, so we choose w n = n/2. So we have shown that the Nash equilibrium payoff is
So this is a "wasteful" case.
By the same argument we can study the case where (for fixed k ≥ 2) the first k recipients get reward n/k. In this case we find 
while the social optimum payoff = 1. Thus by taking k n → ∞ slowly we have a model in which the Nash equilibrium is "totally wasteful".
First passage percolation : general setup
The classical setting for first passage percolation, surveyed in [11] , concerns nearest neighbor percolation on the d-dimensional lattice. Let us briefly state our general setup for first passage percolation (of "information") on a finite graph. There are "rate" parameters ν ij ≥ 0 for undirected edges (i, j). There is an initial vertex v 0 , which receives the information at time 0. At time t, for each vertex i which has already received the information, and each neighbor j, there is chance ν ij dt that j learns the information from i before time t + dt. Equivalently, create independent Exponential(ν ij ) random variables V ij on edges (i, j). Then each vertex v receives the information at time
First passage percolation on the complete graph
Consider first passage percolation on the complete n-vertex graph with rates ν ij = 1/(n − 1). Pick k random agents and writeS n (1) , . . . ,S n (k) for the times at which these k agents receive the information. The key fact for our purposes is that as n → ∞
where the limit variables are independent, ξ has double exponential distribution P (ξ ≤ x) = exp(−e −x ) and each S (i) has the logistic distribution with distribution function
Here d → denotes convergence in distribution. To outline a derivation of (11), fix a large integer L and decompose the percolation times as
where τ L is the time at which some L agents have received the information. By the Yule process approximation (see e.g. [1] ) to the fixed-time behavior of the first passage percolation, the number N (t) of agents possessing the information at fixed large time t is approximately distributed as W e t , where W has Exponential(1) distribution, and so
implying τ L − log L ≈ ξ in distribution, explaining the first summand on the right side of (11). Now consider the proportion H(t) of agents possessing the information at time τ L + t. This proportion follows closely the deterministic logistic equation H ′ = H(1 − H) whose solution is (12) shifted to satisfy the initial condition H(0) = L/n, so this solution approximates the distribution function of S (i) − log(L/n). Thus the timeS n (i) at which a random agent receives the information satisfies (S
in distribution independently as i varies. Now the limit decomposition (11) follow from the finite-n decomposition (13) .. We emphasize (11) instead of more elementary derivations (using methods of [9, 13] ) of the limit distribution forS n (1) − log n because (11) gives the correct dependence structure for different agents. Because only relative order of gaining information is relevant to us, we may recenter by subtracting ξ and suppose that the times at which different random agents gain information are independent with logistic distribution (12).
Analysis of the rank-based reward game
We now return to our general reward framework
The j'th person to learn an item of information gets reward R( Suppose all agents use the Poisson(θ) strategy. In the case θ = 1, the way that a single item of information spreads is exactly as the first passage percolation process above; and the general-θ case is just a time-scaling by θ. So as above, we may suppose that (all calculations in the n → ∞ limit) the recentered time S θ to reach a random agent has distribution function
which is the solution of the time-scaled logistic equation
(Recall F 1 is the logistic distribution (12)). Now consider the case where all other agents use a value θ but ego uses a different value φ. The (limit, recentered) time T φ,θ at which ego learns the information now has distribution function G φ,θ satisfying an analog of (15):
To explain this equation, the left side is the rate at time t at which ego learns the information; this equals the rate φ of calls by ego, times the probability F θ (t) that the called agent has received the information. To solve the equation, first we get
But we know that in the case φ = θ the solution is F θ , that is we know
and so we have the solution of (16) in the form
If ego gets the information at time t then his percentile rank is F θ (t) and his reward is R(F θ (t)). So the expected reward to ego is
We calculate
and so
This is the mean reward to ego from one item, and hence also the mean reward per unit time in the ongoing process. So, including the "communication cost" of φ per unit time, the net payoff (per unit time) to ego is
The criterion (3) for θ to be a Nash equilibrium is, using the fact
This is the second equality in (5), and integrating by parts gives the first equality.
Remark. For the linear reward function
result (5) gives Nash payoff = 1/2. Consider alternatively
Then the n → ∞ Nash equilibrium cost is
In particular, the Nash payoff 1 − θ Nash (u 0 ) satisfies
In words, as the reward becomes concentrated on a smaller and smaller proportion of the population then the Nash equilibrium becomes more and more wasteful. In this sense result (5) in the general framework is consistent with the "finite number of rewards" result (10). Poisson strategy. The allowed strategy for an agent i is to place calls, at the times of a Poisson (rate θ) process, to a random neighboring agent.
We will derive formula (6). As remarked later, the function g(u) is ultimately derived from fine structure of first passage percolation in the plane, and seems impossible to determine as an explicit formula. But of course the main point is that (in contrast to the complete graph case) the Nash equilibrium payoffR − θ Nash N =R − O(N −1 ) tends to the social optimumR.
Nearest-neighbor first passage percolation on the torus
Consider (nearest-neighbor) first passage percolation on the N × N torus, started at a uniform random vertex, with rates ν ij = 1 for edges (i, j). Write (T N i , 1 ≤ i ≤ 4) for the information receipt times of the 4 neighbors of the origin (using paths not through the origin), and write Q N (t) for the number of vertices informed by time t.
The key point is that we expect a N → ∞ limit of the following form
where τ i , 1 ≤ i ≤ 4 are nonnegative with min i τ i = 0; U has uniform(0, 1) distribution; 0 < V < ∞; with a certain complicated joint distribution for these limit quantities.
To explain (21), first note that as N → ∞ the differences T N i − T N * are stochastically bounded (by the time to percolate through a finite set of edges) but cannot converge to 0 (by linearity of growth rate in the shape theorem below), so we expect some non-degenerate limit distribution (τ i , 1 ≤ i ≤ 4). Next consider the time T N 0 at which the origin is wetted. By uniformity of starting position, Q N (T N 0 ) must have uniform distribution on {1, 2, . . . , N 2 }, and it follows that
is related to the shape theorem [11] for first-pasage percolation on the infinite lattice started at the origin. This says that the random set B s of vertices wetted before time s grows linearly with s, and the spatially rescaled set s −1 B s converges to a limit deterministic convex set B:
It follows that
where q(s) is the area of sB regarded as a subset of the continuous torus [0, 1] 2 . Because
where q −1 (·) is the inverse function of q(·). Writing Q ′N (·) for a suitably-interpreted local growth rate of Q N (·) we deduce
and so (22) holds for V = q ′ (q −1 (U )).
Analysis of the rank-based reward game
We want to study the case where other agents call some neighbor at rate θ but ego (at the origin) calls some neighbor at rate φ. To analyze rewards, by scaling time we can reduce to the case where other agents call each neighbor at rate 1 and ego calls each neighbor at rate λ = φ/θ. We want to compare the rank M N λ of ego (rank = j if ego is the j'th person to receive the information) with the rank M N 1 of ego in the λ = 1 case. As noted above, M N 1 is uniform on {1, 2, . . . , N 2 }. Writing (ξ λ i , 1 ≤ i ≤ 4) for independent Exponential(λ) r.v.'s, the time at which the origin receives the information is
and the rank of the origin is
Now in the setting where ego calls at rate φ and others at rate θ we have
and it is straightforward to use (24) to show this
The Nash equilibrium condition d dφ payoff(φ, θ)
Because Z(λ) is decreasing in λ we have z ′ u (1) < 0 and this expression is of the form (6) with
Remark. The distribution of V depends on the function q(·) which depends on the limit shape in nearest neighbor first passage percolation, which is not explicitly known. Also Z(λ) involves the joint distribution of (τ i ), which is not explicitly known, and also is (presumably) correlated with the direction from the percolation source which is in turn not independent of V . This suggests it would be difficult to find an explicit formula for g(u).
Order of magnitude arguments
Here we mention simple order of magnitude arguments for the two basic cases we have already analyzed. As mentioned in the introduction, what matters is the size of the window width w θ,n of the associated first passage percolation process We will re-use such arguments in sections 5 and 6.1, in more complicated settings.
Complete graph. If agents call at rate θ = 1 then by (11) the window width is order 1; so if θ n is the Nash equilibrium rate then the window width w n is order 1/θ n . Suppose w n → ∞. Then ego could call at some fixed slow rate φ and (because this implies many calls are made near the start of the window) the reward to ego will tend to R(0), and ego's payoff R(0) − φ will be larger than the typical payoffR − θ n . This contradicts the definition of Nash equilibrium. So in fact we must have w n bounded above, implying θ n bounded below, implying the Nash equilbrium in wasteful.
Nearest neighbor torus. If agents call at rate θ = 1 then by the shape theorem (23) the window width is order N . The time difference between receipt time for different neighbors of ego is order 1, so if ego calls at rate 2 instead of rate 1 his rank (and hence his reward) increases by order 1/N . By scaling, if the Nash equilibrium rate is θ N and ego calls at rate 2θ N then his increased reward is again of order 1/N . His increased cost is θ N . At the Nash equilibrium the increased reward and cost must balance, so θ N is order 1/N , so the Nash equilibrium is efficient. A simple argument below shows under condition (29) the Nash equilibrium is efficient.
Consider the Nash strategy, and suppose first that the window width w N converges to a limit w ∞ < ∞. Consider a distance d such that the Nash strategy has θ
The increased cost is φc(d) while the increased benefit is at most O(w ∞ φ), because this is the increased chance of getting information earlier. So the Nash strategy must have θ Nash (d) = 0 for sufficiently large d, not depending on N . But for first passage percolation with bounded range transitions, the shape theorem (23) remains true and implies that w N scales as N .
This contradiction implies that the window width w N → ∞. Now suppose the Nash equilibrium were inefficient, with some Nash costθ > 0. Suppose ego adopts the strategy of just calling a random neighbor at rate φ N , where φ N → 0, φ N w N → ∞. Then ego obtains asymptotically the same rewardR as his neighbor, a typical agent. But ego's cost is φ N → 0. This is a contradiction with the assumption of inefficiency. So the conclusion is that the Nash equilibrium is efficient and w N → ∞. (30) Poisson strategy. An agent's strategy is described by a pair of numbers (θ near , θ far ) = θ:
Remarks. Result
This model obviously interpolates between the complete graph model (c N = 1) and the nearest-neighbor model (c N = ∞).
First let us consider for which values of c N the nearest-neighbor Nash equilibrium (θ near is order N −1 , θ far = 0) persists in the current setting. When ego considers using a non-zero value of θ far , the cost is order c N θ far . The time for information to reach a typical vertex is order N/θ near = N 2 , and so the benefit of using a non-zero value of θ far is order θ far N 2 . We deduce that if c N ≫ N 2 then the Nash equilibrium is asymptotically the same as in the nearest-neighbor case; in particular, the Nash equilibrum is efficient.
Let us study the more interesting case
The result in this case turns out to be, qualitatively We first do the order-of-magnitude calculation (section 6.1), then analyze the relevant first passage percolation process (section 6.2), and finally do the exact analysis in section 6.3.
Order of magnitude calculation
Our order of magnitude argument for (31) uses three ingredients (32,33,34). As in section 4 we consider the window width w N of the associated percolation process. Suppose ego deviates from the Nash equilibrium (θ Nash near , θ Nash far ) by setting his θ far = θ Nash far + δ. The chance of thereby learning the information earlier, and hence the increased reward to ego, is order δw N and the increased cost is δc N . At the Nash equilibrium these must balance, so
where ≍ denotes "same order of magnitude". Now consider the difference ℓ N between the times that different neighbors of ego are wetted. Then ℓ N is order 1/θ Nash near . Write δ = θ Nash near and suppose ego deviates from the Nash equilibrium by setting his θ near = 2δ. The increased benefit to ego is order ℓ N /w N and the increased cost is δ. At the Nash equilibrium these must balance, so δ ≍ ℓ N /w N which becomes θ Nash near ≍ w
Finally we need to calculate how the window width w N for FPP depends on (θ near , θ far ), and we show in the next section that
Granted this, we substitute (32,33) to get
N as stated at (31).
First passage percolation on the N × N torus with short and long range interactions
We study the model (call it short-long FPP, to distinguish it from nearest-neighbor FPP) defined by rates
Recall the shape theorem (23) for nearest neighbor first passage percolation; let A be the area of the limit shape B. Define an artificial distance ρ such that B is the unit ball in ρ-distance; so nearest neighbor first passage percolation moves at asymptotic speed 1 with respect to ρ-distance. Consider short-long FPP started at a random vertex of the N × N torus. Write F N,λ N for the proportion of vertices reached by time t and let T (0,0) be the time at which the origin is reached. The event {T (0,0) ≤ t} corresponds asymptotically to the event that at some time t − u there is percolation across some long edge (i, j) into some vertex j at ρ-distance ≤ u from (0, 0) (here we use the fact that nearest neighbor first passage percolation moves at asymptotic speed 1 with respect to ρ-distance). The rate of such events at time t − u is approximately
where the three terms represent the number of possible vertices i, the number of possible vertices j, and the percolation rate ν ij . Since these events occur asymptotically as a Poisson process in time, we get
This motivates study of the equation (for an unknown distribution function
whose solution should be unique up to centering. Writing F 1 for the λ = 1 solution, the general solution scales as
So by (35), up to centering
To translate this result into the context of the rank-based rewards game, suppose each agent uses strategy θ N = (θ N,near , θ N,far ). Then the spread of one item of information is as first passage percolation with rates
This is essentially the case above with λ N = θ N,far /θ N,near , time-scaled by θ N,near , and so by (37) the distribution function F N,θ N for the time at which a typical agent receives the information is
In particular the window width is as stated at (34).
Exact equations for the Nash equilibrium
The equations will involve three quantities: (i) The solution F 1 of (36).
(ii) The area A of the limit set B in the shape theorem (23) for nearest-neighbor first passage pecolation.
for relative receipt times of neighbors of the origin in nearest-neighbor first passage pecolation, where now we start the percolation at a random vertex of ρ-distance ≈ r from the origin.
To start the analysis, suppose all agents use rates θ = (θ N,near , θ N,far ). Consider the quantities S is the first time that ego receives the information from a non-neighbor
T is the first time that ego receives the information from a neighbor
With probability → 1 as N → ∞ ego will actually receive the information first from a neighbor, and so F is asymptotically the distribution function of the time at which ego receives the information.
Now suppose ego uses a different rate φ N,far = θ N,far for calling a non-neighbor. This does not affect T but changes the distribution of S to
by the natural Poisson process approximation. Because θ N,far is small we can approximate
The mean reward to ego for one item, as a function of φ N,far , varies as
The cost associated with using φ N,far is c N φ N,far , and at the Nash equilibrium the cost and reward must balance, so at the Nash equilibrium F = F N,θ N must satisfy
Now suppose instead that ego uses a different rate φ N,near = θ N,near for calling a neighbor. As in section 3.2, we set λ = φ N,near /θ N,near so that we can use rate-1 nearest-neighbor first passage pecolation as comparsion. For (τ i ) at (39) and independent Exponential(λ) random variables (ξ λ i ) write (as at (25)) Z(λ) := min
So Z(λ) is the time difference for ego receiving the information, caused by ego using φ N,near instead of θ N,near . This time difference is measured after time-rescaling; in real time units the time difference is Z(λ)/θ N,near .
As above, write T for receipt time for ego using θ N,near , and F = F N,θ N for its distribution function. Then receipt time for ego using φ N,near is T + Z(λ)/θ N,near , so ego's rank becomes ≈ F (T )+F ′ (T )Z(λ)/θ N,near , and setting U = F (T ) the rank of ego is ≈ U +F ′ (F −1 (U ))Z(λ)/θ N,near . The associated mean reward change for ego is asymptotically
where z(λ) = EZ(λ). Because the cost of using rate φ N,near equals φ N,near , the Nash equilibrium condition (3) implies
We have now obtained the desired two equations for F N,θ N at the Nash equilibrium θ N . Use (38) to rewrite these equations (40,41) in terms of F 1 as
Solving for θ N,near , θ N,far we find
Variants

Transitivity and the symmetric variant
The examples we have studied so far have a certain property called transitivity in graph theory [3] . Informally, transitivity means "the network looks the same to each agent"; formally, it means that for any two agents i, j there is an automorphism of the network that preserves the network cost structure and maps i to j. This is what allows us to assume that in a Nash equilibrium each agent uses same strategy.
The general framework of section 1.1 uses the asymmetric model in which agent i calls agent j (at a certain cost to i) and learns all items that j knows. In the symmetric variant, agent i calls agent j (at a certain cost to i), and each tells the other all items they know.
For the transitive networks we have studied there is a simple relationship between the Nash equilibrium values of the asymmetric and symmetric variants of the Poisson strategies:
The point is that the percolation process in the symmetric variant is just the percolation process in the asymmetric variant, run at twice the speed, and this leads to the following relationship between the reward when ego uses rate φ and other agents use rate θ:
reward sym (φ, θ) = reward asy (φ + θ, 2θ).
Because payoff(φ, θ) = reward(φ, θ) − φ in each case, we get payoff sym (φ, θ) = payoff asy (φ + θ, 2θ) + θ and therefore
The criterion (3) leads to (43).
Communication at regular intervals
We have studied "Poisson rate θ" calling strategies because these are simplest to analyze explicitly. A natural alternative is the "regular, rate θ" strategy in which agent i calls a random other agent at times
where U i is uniform on (0, 1 θ ). Consider first the complete graph case, and the setting (section 2.1) where (for fixed k ≥ 2) the first k recipients get reward n/k. In this case, for k = 2 formula (8) is replaced by P (ego is second to receive item) = min( 
One can now continue the section 2.4 analysis; we do not get useful explicit solutions but the qualitative behavior is similar to the "Poisson calls" case, and in particular the Nash equilibrium is wasteful.
Similarly, on the N × N grid with nearest neighbor interaction, switching from the "Poisson calls" case to the "regular calls" case preserves the order N −1 value of the Nash equilibrium rate θ Nash N and hence preserves its efficiency.
Gossip with reward based on audience size
Perhaps a more realistic model for gossip is to replace Rule 2 by Rule 3. An agent i gets reward c whenever another agent learns an item from i.
For the complete graph and Poisson(θ) strategies we can re-use the section 2.4 analysis to calculate the Nash equilibrium. First suppose all agents use the same rate θ and consider an agent i who receives the information at percentile u. For j > un the j'th agent to receive the information has chance 1 j to receive it from agent i, and so the mean reward to agent i is (calculations in the n → ∞ limit) c 1 u 1 x dx = −c log(1 − u). Suppose now ego switches to rate φ. Then (calls incur unit cost) payoff(φ, θ) = −φ + cE(− log(1 − F θ (T φ,θ )))
where the time T φ,θ at which ego receives the information has distribution function G φ,θ at (17), and where F θ at (14) is the distribution function of the time at which a typical agent receives the information. Now 
So switching to this "Rule 3" model preserves the wastefulness of the Nash equilibrium on the compete graph.
However, for the N × N grid with nearest neighbor interaction, switching to the "Rule 3" models changes the efficient (θ Nash N is order N −1 ) Nash equilibrium to a wasteful equilibrium with θ Nash N becoming order 1.
Related literature
We do not know any literature closely related to our model. As well as the epidemic and the gossip algorithm topics mentioned in the introduction, and classic applied probability work on stochastic rumors [5] , other loosely related work includes
• models where agents form networks under conditions where there are costs for maintaining network edges and benefits from being part of a large network [7] .
• Prisoners' Dilemma games between neighboring agents on a graph [6] .
One can add many other topics which are harder to model mathematically, e.g. diffusion of technological innovations [12] or of ideologies.
